22.i.08 Ethics: Epictetus

Summary of class notes.

Looking over Epictetus, I am struck by a number of basic points.

First, Epictetus’ distinction between “what is up to us” and “what is not up to us” makes me consider the five basic variables in all moral acts.

Remember, there are basically two classes of acts: moral acts and amoral acts. Moral acts can be determined as being good or evil; amoral acts are indifferent: neither good nor evil.

Amongst moral acts, some are forbidden, some are permitted, and some are required.

Furthermore, moral acts may be conditional or unconditional. That is, there may be certain conditions under which one is forbidden, or permitted, or required to do something – or there may be acts which are unconditionally forbidden or required: acts one must never do under any circumstances whatsoever, or which one must always do.

I’m not sure whether permitted acts can ever be said to be unconditional, but maybe…

For Epictetus, what defines the ground of the forbidden, the permitted, and the required, is accordance with nature.

Nature, to Epictetus, is in part physical nature – the universe, the world as it is; in part nature is also human nature, which steps outside of nature in a sense to observe nature.

Some Stoics – as you will see in White’s introduction to our translation – particularly the earlier Stoics, argued that to be fully morally upright, one needed to have a comprehensive knowledge of the structure of nature (physics – particularly an understanding of cause and effect) and logic, which defines the patterns of nature.

To Epictetus, what is required is that we must know what we can do, and do that only. We must not wish for faculties we do not possess: were we to wish, for example, to fly, most people would understand that as foolishness. But to Epictetus it is just as foolish to wish for honors, or wealth. What one can do is act righteously; perhaps one will win honor or wealth through that. Still, there is no guarantee.

What does it mean to act righteously? To do what one can, and not to wish to do what one cannot, and to do what is permitted (neither required nor forbidden) moderately.

Epictetus’ ideas about what one can and cannot do relate to a fundamental cosmology of change. Remember, cosmology is one of the two main branches of metaphysics (the study of ultimate reality). Ontology is the other one: the study of being: what is, and what is not, what is real, and what is unreal? What is the nature of existence? These are ontological questions. Cosmology is the study of the structure of the existing world, of beings: how do existing things relate one to the other? This is a question both of physical beings and of spiritual beings, for Epictetus.

Notice Epictetus’ definition of gods (it appears as a gloss in c 31): “beings that arrange the universe well and justly” (21). He says nothing of making or creating here. The gods may be eternal, but they may not be the creators of the world. It may be that the world, too, is eternal. If so, it has three eternal elements: soul, matter, and change. Without matter, soul cannot be known: it has no sensitivity, no way of acting. Without soul, matter has no form, no structure. But once soul and matter blend, not only have they sensitivity and form, they also are subject to change and therefore to time. In themselves, they may be eternal, but they cannot be known, except by themselves. So I read the business, at any rate.

The gods structure the universe – and do it well (the Greek word means “with goodness” and also “beautifully”) and justly; and a perfected human (one with full knowledge of, for example, physics and logic) able to make correct decisions, is essentially a god.

It is, then, to the state of godliness that one should aspire.

Epictetus’ idea of the soul is perhaps a bit more complex than some people’s. It is not merely “life spark”, but it involves two basic classes of faculty, rational and affective. The rational faculty is pretty much what we call the mind: thinking, judging, contemplating, analyzing: these are cognitive or rational functions. Affective functions are those that have to do with feelings, with emotions, with fears, desires, aversions.

To Epictetus, we have control of our own cognitive and affective faculties, in short, over our souls – but we do not have control over other peoples’ cognitive and affective faculties.

We can imagine a diagramming of Epictetus vision of the universe: two arcs intersecting; where they meet is the body; one of the circles we may label “the soul” and the rest of the diagram is then that which outside of the soul.

Although we allow others’ opinions and actions to effect our soul, this is not necessary: others may, indeed, have complete control over our bodies, but properly no one else should have any impact whatsoever on our souls, unless we permit that impact.

This would clearly be a godlike state – in fact, not godlike, but godly.

Yet it is to that state that Epictetus aspires. His full concentration seems to be on how to achieve that state, and, although he does not use the term, it seems to me that his primary concern is with the will.


To develop the will, Epictetus points to the development of habit and routine, a kind of craft and art of living, in which those acts which are merely permitted are reduced to a minimum, and kept moderate in their exercise; those things necessary are done without fail, and those things forbidden are strictly avoided.

Forbidden acts may be said to be of two types, physical acts and mental or affective acts: thoughts and feelings. Physically forbidden acts are hardly a problem: they simply cannot be performed. But when one wishes for, or thinks about, acts which cannot be performed, one is in essence performing an immoral act, a forbidden act. It is acting outside of nature to wish for something which cannot be, just as much as it is forbidden by nature for a human to fly (say), or to breathe water.

Similarly, required acts are those which are purely in accordance with human nature. Fundamentally, it is required that one should come to understand the real nature of things, and to control one’s feelings and judgments to the degree that one desires those things which express the will of nature, and feel and aversion to those things that violate the will of nature.

Permitted acts, again, should be kept to a minimum and engaged in moderately.