Epictetus Encheiridion
c 1 Epictetus’ initial statement about what we can and cannot do reflects in a certain way the three basic categories of moral acts:
those required, commanded, necessary
those permitted but not required
those forbidden
consider Epictetus’ statement about acting moderately (¶2)
Q.: Is this a reflection of the Aristotelian mean?
The Aristotelian mean: do all in moderation – find the middle ground between excess and deficieincy. In some respects this seems as though it would appeal to Epictetus. However, he does have a sense of
1) the necessity of force in certain conditions
2) askesis: the discipline of an athlete. (Hence the English “ascetic”).
This latter is really central to Epictetus’ understanding.
c1 ¶1 He describes if not defines “things up to us”:
free
unhindered
unimpeded – essentially he is giving synonyms rather than presenting three different parts of the definition.
Q: what makes these acts free? Epictetus seems to concentrate on the will – although he may not use the term.
c1¶3 Phantasia – “the immediate experience of sense or feeling”
Distinguish the moral significance of supposing that some experiences at least may be what they seem to be.
White mentions the skeptics – this school proposes that nothing is which is experienced can be assumed to be real.
c2 Desire & aversion
Partially this may be a matter of White’s translation, but I have the strongest sense that Epictetus’ conclusion are Buddhist. It is possible – even likely -- that Buddhist ideas had some currency in the Graeco-Roman world. Desire and Aversion are two points of experience from which the Buddhist is counseled… on the other hand, Epictetus is not counseling the elimination of desire and aversion, but the application of desire and aversion to points over which one can have control. This again points to Epictetus’ focus on will.
c 2: “for the time being eliminate desire completely”.
This is an important point: Epictetus does not argue for the complete elimination of desire, but for its complete but temporary elimination. The condition of desire is proper understanding until one has achieved proper knowledge, desire will inevitably lead to trouble. I suppose the litmus test of proper knowledge is that when one has it, to desire something will not lead to an unhappy result.
unfortunate – failing to get what one wants
misfortunate – getting what one doesn’t want.
c 3 The askesis here is simple but not easy. Begin with what is easier and work up to the more difficult.
c 4 the askesis here is to discern classes of situation – those which are under our control and those which are not under our control.
c 5 Judgements – attitudes. This is the locus of upset. But there – judgments / attitudes are purely “up to us”. We are generally very read to perceive these as imposed. But Epictetus’ (the Stoic) position is that here – in attitudes – we have control. To Epictetus, the locus of control is the “soul”, which to him means not only the life-force, but the will, the consciousness, and in large part what we might b more inclined to call the “mind” rather than the “soul”.
“Uneducated” – Epictetus points to Paideia, the process of education. Werner Jaeger examined the Greek concept of paideia at length in his three-volume work entitled, of all things, Paideia. Jaeger’s thesis is in part that paideia is fundamentally moral training; surely Epictetus’ concern is centered here.
Cf. White’s discussion of what knowledge is required on 4.
“Uneducated person accuses others; partly educated person accuses himself; fully educated person accuses no-one” echoes Lao Tzu c 41 “When the highest type of men hear Tao,/ they diligently practice it./ When the average type of men hear Tao,/ They half believe in it. / When the lowest type of men hear Tao, They laugh heartily at it” (tr Chan 1963).
Those who have a high degree of understanding have equanimity.
c 7 is reminiscent of some of Jesus’ teachings in the Gospels, and some commentators have argued that Jesus was himself a Stoic, or at least influenced by Stoicism: this is far from impossible, and indeed the influence at least seems likely. Jesus often argues that it is better to concentrate on what is truly important, which is the life of the soul, rather than on the body – like Epictetus, Jesus sometimes carries this to extremes (see Mt 8.22 and 12.46ff for examples).
c 8 could be interpreted in a “panglossian” way, that is, it could seem as though Epictetus is arguing that this world is the best of all possible worlds.
c9 The implication of this chapter is that ‘you” is not the body. See also c 53, last quotation. This mind/body dualism is notable – we may well question what the “I” is that is distinguished from the body.
Q.: Consider whether situations exist in which illness or injury DO effect the will.
c 10. Stoic virtues:
self control – to deal with temptation
endurance – to deal with hardship
patience – to deal with abuse.
Compare these virtues with those enumerated by Paul in I Cor 13.13: faith, hope, and love.
The Stoic virtues allow one to distinguish between reality and appearance.
c 11 “given back” – we are just passing through life – yet what we take and give back is the material existence – yet there is it seems something which is individual; therefore moral considerations are meaningfully applied to individual acts. If all – including selves or selfhood – were corporate or mutual, no accountability could be expected of the individual.
c 12 Begin with small things. The Greek term for “to make progress” here, “prokoptein” is based on the verb “koptein”, which is roughly cognate of the English “chop”, so “prokoptein” is “to chip away”. Slowly but surely, one reduces the problem bit by bit, stroke by stroke.
c 13 If people think you amount to something, distrust yourself. This sounds a bit grim, but here as elsewhere Epictetus is particularly concerned that one not adopt the ideas of others without testing them, and to be careful not to place confidence in anything outside of oneself.
c 14: Want not to fail to get what you desire. Another way to put this is: want to succeed to get what you desire. This comes back to Epictetus’ emphasis upon really clearly visualizing what is involved in achieving the aim, and keeping that aim always in front of one as a target. Do not allow anything to stand in the way of a program you have set yourself.
c 15: Here in the situation of the banquet, it seems as though etiquette has been applied broadly and made into an ethical principle: wait your turn, and when your turn comes do not extend it.
c 16 Sympathize outwardly, but do not be caught up internally. See too, c 31: “It is always appropriate to make libations and sacrifices and give first fruits according to the custom of one’s forefather, in a manner … neither slovenly nor careless, nor indeed cheaply nor beyond one’s means” (21). This echoes something of the Confucian ethical theory that one should act outwardly in accordance with tradition, while inwardly remaining free from attachment. There is also some sense here of the motto “when in Rome do as the Romans” – but this motto should not be taken to mean that internally one changes from one position to another, only that one should respect the traditions of whatever community in which one finds oneself.
Note, too, that here Epictetus argues for a mean between excess and deficiency.
c 17 The notion of being actors performing a play which we have not written is echoed, for example, in Shakespeare (As You Like It 2.7). Epictetus here as elsewhere does not elevate the human to a position of direction of natural order: we must rather accommodate ourselves to the natural order as it is.
c 18 “All signs are favorable if I wish [because] it is up to me to be benefited by whichever of them turns out to be correct.” Although here we may be distracted by the notion of “signs” or omens, which we generally construe as being “unscientific”, “irrational”, and “superstitious” – which seems to be outside of what we expect from Epictetus – the basic gist is well in keeping with Epictetus’ philosophy; if there are meaningful signs in events, they show something outside of ourselves, and therefore they do not impact that over which we have control. That which is outside our control we deal with through our reactions, so it really doesn’t matter how things happen – in any case we must deal with our reactions to them. I am reminded of the Ferengi Rules of Acquisition: Rule 34: “War is good for business.” Rule 35: “Peace is good for business”.
c 19 Only enter contests you can control if you wish to be victorious. Despise what is not up to us.
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